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Abstract. Sometimes, theoreticians explicitly state that they consider their models as examples. 
When this is not the case, it is fairly common for theoreticians to attribute to their models the 
characteristics and objectives of illustrative examples. However, this way of understanding models 
has not received enough attention in the methodological literature focused on economics. Given 
that didactic examples and their properties are extremely familiar in practice, considering 
theoretical models as examples can offer a useful perspective on models and their properties. On 
the basis of both explanatory and exemplifying role played by the deductive arguments by which 
results are proved, the paper emphasizes also the importance of understanding in theoretical work, 
the analogical and tentative character of the application of models, the central role played by the 
above mentioned arguments in such application, the didactic function of theory, and the 
transmision of plausibility from those arguments to the results obtained.     
 
Key words. Models, examples, explanatory arguments, theoretical understanding, analogical 
application. 
 
 
JEL Classification: B41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In his influential article of 2000 on the status of theoretical models in economics, Robert 
Sugden wondered about the type of justification and inference which may connect the 
concrete results obtained by analysing models, and the hypotheses about the real world 
for which these models aim to offer support. Let us suppose that the result of the 
analysis are conditional associations of the form “if certain causal factors occur, then a 
determined effect occurs”. The question is whether deriving a regular association of this 
kind within the framework of the model offers any support for considering that this 
regularity will be fulfilled in the real world, even as a tendency. Sugden contends that 
good models (at least) do offer this support, and that it is inductive in nature. 
 
On commenting the characteristics of the models he studies (Akerlof’s “market for 
lemons” and Thomas Schelling’s “checkerboard city”), Sugden discusses and defends 
the idea that it is the model and not the real market for used cars that Akerlof is using as 
an example, and points out that Akerlof himself calls his model an example in the title 
of section II of his article.  In addition, the similarities he details between this model and 
Schelling’s make his position regarding the former entirely applicable to the latter. In 
this way, he establishes the exemplifying and illustrative function of these models. But 
he does it  with reference to the inferential problem on which his attention is focused, as 
an additional mean of highlighting the restricted extent of generality and the clear lack 
of realism in the models under consideration. Thus he leaves open the question about to 
what extent expressly considering theoretical models as examples could be relevant.  
 
In fact, there are theoreticians who explicitly state that they propose and analyse their 
models as examples ( for instance Akerlof, 1970: 490; Lucas, 1972: 103, 104; Spence, 
1973: 361-2; Salop and Stiglitz, 1977: 494; and Pissarides, 1992: 1372, 1377). 
Moreover, even when this is not the case, it is fairly common for theoreticians to 
attribute to their models the characteristics and objectives of illustrative examples. One 
of these extremely numerous cases is Murphy et al. (1989: 1004-6), who state that the 
models they analyse are highly stylized, but that they capture the essential aspects of the 
problem on which their article is centred, namely ‘to understand the importance of 
demand spillovers’ for the industrialization of underdeveloped countries.
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However, this way of understanding models has not received the attention it deserves in 
the methodological literature focused on economics. Among the authors who have 
considered the  illustrative use of models are Franklin M. Fisher (1989), Paul Krugman 
(1994; 1995), Philippe Mongin (2001) and Roger Backhouse (2002: 209).
 The position 
of Fisher and Mongin is rather critical of this use of models. 
 
The idea of models as  particularized examples contrasts with received ideas about 
theories. Traditionally,  theories were conceived of as formulations which were general 
in character. In addition, although the process of employing examples has been 
considered and used from time immemorial as a didactic resource, it has not tended to 
be given a significant epistemic status in the contemporary philosophy of science. 
Catherine Elgin (2006), who takes the notion of exemplifying from Nelson Goodman, is 
an exception. This lack of attention seems to be the result of two causes: first, the 
secondary status to which analogical relations have been relegated by a large part of the 
  2profession; and second, the idea that these relations are of interest when dealing with a 
change of domain, as occurs when a model from another discipline is imported and 
reinterpreted, or when aspects and properties of things which are different in nature are 
transferred metaphorically. Something similar seems to have occurred in the rhetorical 
current of economics, where the territory of analogy also seems to be dominated by the 
concept of metaphor. 
 
This paper aims to show that considering theoretical models as examples can offer a 
useful perspective from a methodological point of view. Didactic models are extremely 
familiar in practice, as are the concept and main properties of good examples. Thus the 
simple idea of there being theoretical models constructed and analysed to fulfil this 
illustrative role leads naturally to a  comprehensive vision and an initial justification of 
the function of these models and their most outstanding characteristics. The third 
section of this article  deals with some of these aspects and characteristics, which have  
already been dealt with in the literature from other perspectives. 
 
Before this, the second section aims to specify what is actually exemplified when a 
model is claimed to be an example, and what elements are used for the purpose of 
exemplifying.  
 
First, this  part contends that the argument that proves a regular association derived 
from the model is habitually also a detailed explanation of how and why this regularity 
takes place.  Next this section  defends  that this argument, which is both demonstrative 
and explicative, and whose development and content are limited within the framework 
of the model, is undoubtedly the element which deserves most attention with regard to 
the exemplifying function of the model and the epistemic function it carries out. The 
argument describes the mechanism by which, step by step, the causal factors end up 
producing the final effect; it exemplifies the analogical arguments or mechanisms which 
could be applied (or not) to other cases and situations, whether theoretical or empirical, 
as well as a type or a pattern of explicative argument or mechanism of a more general 
character (cf. Backhouse, 2002: 202, 209).
3 Finally, section IV sums up the main 
conclusions.  
 
Moving in the heuristic context, the perspective offered by the illustrative function of 
models is different from that offered by analyses focused on, for example, inferential 
questions. But, although it is different, it may be complementary. The differences 
presented by the illustrative perspective in relation to these analyses may be not so 
much in substance as related to the prominence and emphasis with which certain 
characteristics linked to the exemplifying function of models and the arguments derived 
from them are highlighted. This is particularly the case with the position of Robert 
Sugden. Although  he does not expressly consider the illustrative function which 
theoretical models may carry out, his position offers points which coincide and develop 
basic aspects inspired by this function.
4 Allan Gibbard and Hal Varian (1978) also do 
not use the idea of exemplification expressly as the point from which to judge the role 
of theoretical models, but their characterization of models which they assimilate to 
caricatures also basically coincide with this perspective.   
 
It is worth pointing out that the understanding of any model from the illustrative 
perspective is not always either useful or pertinent. Since the second third part of the 
last century (to give some kind of chronological reference point), there have been 
  3various theoretical research strategies, and research pieces of different characteristics 
have been called ‘models’. At the theoretical level itself, it should be remembered that 
Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu (1954) called their initial contribution to the theory 
of general equilibrium a ‘model’. The classes and types of models that I consider in this 
work as particularly susceptible to be treated as examples are precisely those which  
began to become generalized as pieces of a research strategy clearly differentiated  from 
this theory. On the other hand, these classes of models do not include those of other 
contemporary and distinct research strategies, as for example that sustained by Robert 
Lucas and Edward Prescott for the study of business cycles.
5   
 
To document and illustrate my argument I will refer to some models which have been 
commented in the methodological literature, and above all to that proposed by Salop 
and Stiglitz (1977)
6, the first analysed by Pissarides (1992)
7, and Akerlof's ‘lemons’ 
model, which I will use most often because of its extreme simplicity and because it is so 
well known. 
 
 
2. What is being exemplified? 
 
Models may illustrate various things. For our purposes, there are three objects of 
exemplification which are worth highlighting: (1) the kinds of case, situation or system 
exemplified by the case, situation or system configured by the corresponding models (a 
market, a sector, an economy, etc.); (2) the regular associations exemplified by the 
results obtained deductively from these models; and (3) above all, the types of 
arguments which explain how and why these regularities occur, and which are 
exemplified by the deductive arguments by which the results are demonstrated.  
 
2.1. Exemplification of regular associations
8  
 
Usually, the analysis of models is used as a basis for proposing regular associations 
between phenomena. The corresponding regularities obtained using a model, and thus 
within the framework defined by the model, exemplify as instances the general 
regularities which have been proposed. 
 
For instance, with his model of the used-car market, Akerlof (1970) proposes and 
supports a hypothesis which he dubs the “lemons principle”. According to this, if the 
product or service which is exchanged in a market has different qualities, and one of the 
parties in the market, but not the other, lacks information about the quality of the 
concrete units of this good, the volume of transactions tends to diminish, and may even 
disappear completely.
9 The Salop and Stiglitz (1976) model, to cite another well-known 
example, proposes and supports as its main hypothesis that if the information buyers 
have about the price of a good, and above all if the disposition to get more complete 
information varies between buyers (whether for reasons of greater difficulty or cost, 
simple attitude, or any others), then the same good will tend to be sold at different 
prices in this market (thus generating price dispersion). 
 
Both of these papers aim is to analyse some of the consequences which certain causal 
factors or conditions may originate. Thus these contributions thus seem to have a 
predictive purpose. On the other hand, other papers aim to offer an explanation of a 
regular phenomenon, showing the conditions, causes or factors which would produce it. 
  4This is the case, for example, in the model of Pissarides (1992). The aim of his analysis 
is to offer an explanation of the persistence of unemployment, i.e. the statistically 
observed fact that the recovery of employment does not entirely depend on the recovery 
in activity, but partly on the existence, level and duration of unemployment in previous 
periods. The author maintains that the factor which explains this phenomenon is the loss 
of skills among the unemployed. Lucas (1972), quoted by Mongin (2001) as a 
representative of the most widely used type of theoretical modelling, is another paper 
with an expressly explicative purpose. The aim of his article is to offer an explanation 
suggesting that although the agents do not suffer from monetary illusion, purely 
monetary variations can nevertheless have consequences on their activity. The 
explanatory factor he offers is the incapacity of the agents to distinguish between 
variations in demand which are real in character or origin and those which are purely 
nominal. In other cases (e.g. Spence 1973 or Brander and Spencer 1983), rather than 
highlighting any specific set of explanatory factors in particular, the explanation works 
by showing the underlying conditions and behaviour of the agents under which the main 
regularity is produced or could be produced.  
 
In any event, in order to unify and simplify my argument I am going to assume that the 
models I refer to in this paper aim to present and support a hypothesis according to 
which if certain trigger phenomena -or causal factors occur, a certain effect occurs.
10 To 
do this, the instance corresponding to this more general regular association is obtained 
deductively from the underlying conditions and the behaviour postulated in the model. I 
will refer to this association as the ‘main regularity’.  
 
At the same time, in order to include additional aspects of the phenomenon under study, 
not one but various results are usually established as derived from the same model or 
from variants of the model analyzed with the aim of comparison. This is the case, for 
example, with the welfare consequences linked to the regular associations which have 
been proposed. Another example is when it is additionally established, or when a model 
is made to imply in a trivial way, that if the causal factors in this regularity are not 
present, the final effect will not be produced (in a causal control result like  the method 
of difference proposed by John Stuart Mill in his System of Logic).
 
 
I will also assume for the sake of simplicity that the results presented in the scientific 
contribution are obtained from a single model. Thus I am assuming that a theoretical 
contribution offers a regular association as a single result, based on a single model. At 
the same time, I will concentrate on a single contribution, thus omitting the relevant fact 
that theoretical investigation is a shared task, and that the same kind of phenomena or 
regularities tend to be a shared object of analysis in a series of interrelated contributions.  
The degree of simplification and  unrealisticness of a model, for instance,  tends to be 
conditioned precisely by the position it occupies in this series.   
 
2.2. The explanatory effort 
 
Now, if the main regularity and the kind of case or situation under analysis were the 
only objects exemplified, the consideration of models as examples would lack interest. 
The most interesting aspect of the illustrative function of models resides in the 
exemplification of the argumentative or explicative pattern. 
 
  5In schematic representations of the nomological-deductive model, the explanans and the 
explanandum are usually separated (or you could say connected) by a horizontal line 
expressing that the latter is derived deductively from the former. However, nothing 
more is said about the argument which proves this logical relation. It remains in the 
background as an auxiliary element which does not deserve any further consideration.    
 
In contrast, in a theoretical contribution the proof of the results tends to be an element of 
great importance. In addition, in contributions based on illustrative models, the 
demonstrations fulfil a twin function of demonstration and explanation. At each point of 
their structure they describe step-by-step a mechanism by which, in the conditions 
indicated, the causal factors result in the required effect. Thus these demonstrations 
offer an explanation (not merely mathematical, but substantive) giving a detailed, 
precise and rigorous exposition of how and why the main regularity is produced.
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A feature which reflects the  explanatory aim associated with demonstrations is the 
weakening of formalist standards imposed by the axiomatic method, typical of the 
theory of equilibrium in general. The introduction of the terms is no longer so rigorous, 
and the presentation of its formal characteristics tends to be accompanied by the 
presentation of its meaning or extra-mathematical interpretation. At the same time, 
standards of rigour in presenting proofs are less demanding, to the extent that on some 
occasions, to prevent an excessive formal detail from obscuring the central line of 
argument, these details are consigned to an appendix, or are simply left undeveloped,  
sometimes with an indication that they can be found in some other place (see, for 
example, Rotschild and Stiglitz, 1976, and Salop and Stiglitz, 1977).  
   
This weakening of formalist rigour can also be clearly seen in the importance placed on 
the narrative aspect when actually developing a demonstration (cf. McCloskey: 1983. 
505).  Although the conclusions are reached on the basis of a formally valid argument, 
this argument runs as a narrative mechanism rather than as a formal proof. At other 
times, the narrative includes steps and elements which do not form part of the 
mathematical argument. For example, informational asymmetry is the reason why, in 
the  “market for lemons” model, the buyers use statistics to estimate quality. It is 
precisely because of the role assumed by economic or extra-mathematical interpretation, 
which in his opinion tends to invade the territory of inference, that Mongin (2001: 136) 
sustains that these arguments are persuasive rather than proving in character. 
 
 Likewise, the typical regulatory ideals of mathematical demonstrations, such as 
simplicity and elegance, tend to be subordinated to the aim of presenting the reasoning 
clearly and of making it easy to understand. This aim also leads  authors to use other 
didactic resources, including (of course) traditional graphics. This is particularly evident 
in Akerlof (1970), which  includes practically no mathematical proofs. The  formal 
model is so elemental from a mathematical point of view that they are unnecessary. A 
result of this extreme simplicity in the model is that it allows us to understand very 
easily why all transactions in the market end up eliminated. However, as it happens, the 
explanation offered by the formalized model is not the only one offered by the author. 
In fact, before actually reading the model, one has already understood how it works. 
This other previous explanation is not only very simple, but completely heuristic and 
informal. It is developed within the framework of what we could call a heuristic or 
narrative model, which is more simplified still than the formal  one. In addition, once 
  6the argument is understood, one realizes that it can immediately be generalized to any 
finite number of qualities. 
 
The attitude of Stiglitz, another representative author, is similar. Already on the first 
page of their paper, Salop and Stiglitz (1977) explain briefly and informally the 
argument which leads to the main result (as in fact does Pissarides, 1992, offering the 
general lines of argument on the first page; these are later developed to establish his 
main hypothesis). In addition, apart from the decided aim to present the questions and 
develop the reasoning in a fundamentally heuristic tone, before beginning to develop 
any of the proofs  they explain the structure which they have imposed on all of them to 
make them easier to understand. As if this were not enough, to make the handling of the 
model and intuitive comprehension of the arguments based on it easier, after 
formulating it they dedicate a new section to presenting briefly and clearly the central 
features and elements of the way it works, which they end up calling ‘the essence of the 
model’ (pp 497-8). The effort to develop a narrative and understandable reasoning is 
also very evident in Rotschild and Stiglitz (1976: 634-7), although it is true that the 
model here is more technically complex. 
 
To give a final example, Spence (1973) places such an emphasis on making the reason 
how and why signalling is produced comprehensible that he ends up basing his 
exposition on an extremely simple numerical model, which as a result - and as he 
himself admits - does not harbour any greater pretensions to generality.  
 
Another option which can also be seen on occasion is to focus the analysis on cases or 
situations of a type that are especially familiar or well known, and in which the 
phenomena under analysis are presented in a prototypical manner. This is the reason 
Akerlof (1970: 489), for example, gives as determining his choice of the used-car 
market as a case study. Similarly, Spence (1973) situates the issue from the beginning in 
the labour market, as it is a market in which the phenomenon of signalling is  present in 
a ‘paradigmatic’ way. For similar reasons, he chooses education as a significant 
example of a signal, and sex as an indicative example of an index, i.e. as an example of 
an observable characteristic which, as any  signal, may be informative about other 
qualities of the agents, but which unlike  signals, is outside the agents’ control. In a 
similar way Rotschild and Stigliz (1976), in studying the mechanism of self-selection 
which results from the adverse selection problem, model and analyse an insurance 
market,   which is a market where the problem of adverse selection is proverbial. They 
also look for perfectly competitive equilibria, despite the fact that insurance markets are 
habitually far from being perfectly competitive. 
 
In short, in the proofs derived from illustrative models it is usually possible to clearly 
identify an explicative aim, and this has an important place in the objectives which the 
scientific contribution is aiming for.  
 
2.3. Exemplifying argumentative variables and  explanatory models 
 
If we now combine this importance of the explicative component with the illustrative 
aim attributed to the model, it seems reasonable to include the demonstrative and  
explanatory argument among the elements which contribute notably to the exemplifying 
function of the model. This is why, according to my main thesis, the aim of the analysis 
of an illustrative model  is usually to exemplify a generic form of explanatory  (and 
  7perhaps also predictive) argument that we could call an argumentative or explanatory 
pattern, and that is considered applicable to other cases and situations, forming an 
essential part of the scientific contribution which is being presented. The argumentative 
mechanisms expounded by these arguments function as prototypes or examples which 
facilitate recognition and suggest the development of analogical arguments referring and 
adapted to other cases and situations, whether theoretical or empirical. 
 
This exemplifying function of demonstrative-explicative arguments is usually evident 
and observable simply by reading the corresponding literature. This function can be 
usually detected even though the authors do not expressly attribute it to the models they 
present and analyse.  
 
A model tends to be a specific option chosen among other similar options in which 
some or many of the prevailing environmental conditions or behavioural assumptions 
vary. For this reason, reading it tends to raise questions as to whether it is possible to 
develop analogical arguments and explanations adapted to these variations, and at the 
same time tends to offer suggestions on the way this could be done. These indications 
are at times so clear that the formulation of the corresponding extension becomes trivial. 
Naturally, suggestions related to other  more  distant  variants are vaguer and devising 
analogical arguments  may demand a more complex construction.  
 
After all, this analogical capacity of the argumentative developments of models is a 
similar phenomenon at the psychological level to that which is produced when the 
demonstration of a mathematical theorem raises conjectures on the possibility of 
developing some variation to establish another theorem, or when an application of a 
formal theorem raises conjectures on the possibility of applying it to obtain some other 
formal or theoretical result.  
 
One class of variants which are originated or suggested by the argumentative 
mechanism derived from the model are those originated by changes which do not affect 
either the final effect or the factors  considered as crucial, whether the causal factors be 
those postulated in the model or the intermediary ones which may  arise during the 
argument. To use once more the “market for lemons”  model as an illustration, these 
changes may affect the groups of agents, their utility functions, or the supply and 
demand conditions, for example. The changes may also include the consideration of 
elements, phenomena or conditions which have not been borne in mind in the original 
argument, as would occur if the sellers were substituted by companies in Akerlof’s 
model.  
 
At the same time, it also tends to be relatively easy to recognize or develop some 
version of the argumentative and explicative pattern of which the argument derived 
from the model is a direct example.  
 
Sometimes this task is easy because the authors themselves offer us an explicit 
summary of the explicative mechanism, as for example Pissarides (1992) does in a 
summary fashion, and as Salop and Stiglitz (1976: 497-8) do, both at the start of their 
paper and additionally further on, this time in a detailed way, when before developing 
the demonstration they dedicate a section to presenting the argument in a panoramic and 
more intuitive way.  
  
  8But although the authors do not explicitly offer a version of the argumentative pattern 
exemplified directly by the functioning of the model, the recognition of the 
argumentative pattern tends to be a relatively simple task. Continuing with the Akerlof 
model as an illustration, the core of the explanation is a series of reasoned steps as 
follows: Whatever the given price is, the sellers will not be prepared to sell qualities 
which they value at above this price; they will only be prepared to sell qualities if the 
value  that they derive from these qualities is equal or lower than this price. But if they 
sell qualities they value at this price, they will not be prepared to accept an inferior price 
either. For their part, the buyers use a statistic such as the average, and estimate a 
quality which is below the best quality the sellers are prepared to offer at this price. 
Thus if their interest in consuming the estimated quality is not exorbitantly high, they 
will only be prepared to pay a lower price to buy a unit. As a result, there will be no 
transactions, because the buyers will not be prepared to pay the minimum price at which 
the sellers are prepared to sell, and the sellers will not be prepared to sell at the 
maximum price which the buyers are prepared to pay.  
 
The analogical variants illustrated and exemplified by the model may also respond to 
changes in the crucial factors of the argumentative mechanism, whether causal or 
intermediary, or in the final effect. For example: the buyers can use another statistic 
other than the average to estimate the quality; or there may be other distributions of 
quality levels which are different from those included in the model; or it may even be 
supposed, as Akerlof does himself before presenting his formal model, that the range of 
disposable qualities is discrete.  Analogously, among the possible effects could be 
varying levels of diminution in transactions, but without the market disappearing. This 
is a  plausible interpretation of the  “lemons principle” (Sugden, 2000: 5-6). The type of 
informational asymmetry itself which triggers the process may also be different. For 
example, the first case which Akerlof comments as an example of the application of his 
analysis is the market for medical insurance for the elderly. Here the informational 
asymmetry affects sellers (insurance companies), unlike what happens in the  “market 
for lemons” model. Another example is Salop and Stiglitz (1976), who repeatedly refer 
to the possibility of varying the assumptions on the costs of information and the result 
of the search for it, stressing that the result of their analysis may not be completely 
robust in the case of some of these variations.  
 
This class of changes gives rise to a greater diversity between analogical variants and 
extensions of the argumentative mechanism. Despite this diversity, the original 
explanation and its variants can also be seen as different forms in which a more general 
explanatory pattern tends to materialize. Recognizing it may be more difficult, but these 
difficulties do not tend to be substantial. For example, returning to  Akerlof’s model, 
whatever the statistic used, the buyers  may tend to estimate a level of quality which is 
inferior to that of one part of the qualities which are put on sale. Thus, if their valuation 
of the product is not very strong, they will tend to value the estimated quality below its 
price, which is the minimum price the sellers are prepared to sell the best qualities for. 
The result will be the same. At the same time, a more general conceptualization of the 
relations between ‘principal and agent’ allows us to relate the key steps in the lemons 
model to those which have to be taken in applying the same type of reasoning to the 
medical insurance market for the elderly, thus describing the generalized type of 
analysis which is applied in both cases, and which the first case exemplifies.  
 
  9To sum up, although the focus is only on a single model, the comprehension of its 
explanatory development tends to suggest the form which variants  and extensions of 
this explanation could take when adapted to other specific cases,  or to other domains of 
cases, as is particularly clear from the ease with which the closest variants tend to be 
perceived. In the same way, the explicative argument derived from the model tends to 
suggest and exemplify a type or general pattern of explanation made up of all these 
variants and extensions. This type can be represented or described through summary 
arguments which are usually easy to understand and construct, and in which key or 
distinctive inferential elements and steps stand out. Sugden (2000: 6, 8) points out that 
the main regularities may be presented in a vague way; they may even be only exhibited 
without being expressly formulated. With argumentative patterns this circumstance is 
even more marked, and for more justified reasons. Thus there should be no surprise that 
when an argumentative pattern is proposed, in many cases it is not proposed explicitly; 
nor should there be any surprise that when it is explicit, as for example in Pissarides 
(1992), what is offered are informal summaries which do not seek a greater level of 
precision.  
 
In any event, it  should be borne in mind that ex ante exemplification offered by models 
and their argumentative developments has a more operative character than that of the 
examples habitually used as didactic means. Normally, a didactic example is an ex post 
illustration of a more general concept or phenomenon which existed previously and is 
familiar, and of which the example is an instance. In the case of models and their 
explanatory developments this does not tend to be the case. Usually,  they illustrate 
something which is unknown and still has to be configured. Usually, they illustrate the 
characteristics of the general type of argumentative mechanisms which exemplify and 
also illustrate how other instances of it may be. But both the general type and the new 
instances reveal themselves precisely as the  new instances are constructed in 
accordance with the suggestions of the original example and of the additional examples 
available.
12   
 
There is no reason why the analogical or illustrative capacity of a model should limit 
itself to the theoretical formal level. In the same way as at the theoretical level, the  
explanatory development of a model tends to suggest (with more or less relative clarity 
according to the specific case) how the same type or analogous types of explanation  
could or should be applied to other informal cases and contexts (whether real or 
artificial) different from those configured by the model, as well as to other domains of 
informal and empirical environments.   
 
Akerlof (1970) once more offers us an illustration of the relationship which the analysis 
of a formalized model may have with its possible analogical  casual applications and 
with the informal analogical arguments it suggests. The most extensive section of his  
paper is dedicated to indicating informally how the same type of analysis which has 
been carried out on the formalized model can be applied to other empirical fields and 
problems, such as the insurance market, the employment of minorities, the effects of 
dishonesty in business, and the credit markets in underdeveloped countries (cf. Sutton 
(2000) on a similar casual application of the model of Salop and Stiglitz). 
 
In these kind of applications, the arguments suggested tend to be imprecise, schematic 
and informal. In addition, they normally lack formal validity and  are hypothetical in 
nature. Empirical cases and situations may adopt multiple forms in terms of the 
  10background conditions and relevant factors.  Likewise, knowledge of these conditions 
and factors may not be sufficiently detailed. All this may  imply that references to these 
conditions and factors have to be vague and imprecise descriptions or simple allusions, 
instead of clear and sufficiently  specified formulations. At the same time, the 
vagueness and lack of specificity as to the conditions and factors which should 
intervene in the argument may have an  effect on the vague and schematic nature of the 
inferential connections of which it is made up. The regular associations of the 
conditional form “if… then” which the argument sets out  along its development tend to 
be more schematic and less detailed than those offered by a formalized proof. In 
addition, many of these regular associations may lack formal validity, and  may only 
achieve the status of material implications, to which a greater or lesser level of 
plausibility or confidence may be attributed, according to the case in question. As a 
result, the qualification as merely reliable or plausible also affects the argument itself, 
which after all is not more than a conjunction of all these intermediary associations (and 
which may be seen as a conjunction of hypotheses about these associations). 
Consequently, this qualification also  tends to affect the main regularity. 
 
It must be pointed out that these less precise, more schematic and informal arguments 
may, and usually do present a similar structure to more formalized explicative 
arguments. Specifically, it may consist in (or could be reconstructed as)  a series of 
interlinked conditional associations corresponding to successive inferential steps. At the 
same time, this series tends to end up implying the main regularity by virtue of some 
elementary logical rule, such as the transitivity of implication or the rule of the 
elimination of premises.
13  
 
The empirical application of the analysis of a model is not limited to causal 
applications: they can also be econometric.  The situations generated by  applications of 
this kind  are different. However, the inspirational role of the theoretical model (or 
theoretical models) and the analogical character of the relation between the models of 
one level and those of another do not appear to vary substantially. 
 
One of the reasons for which the work of Pissarides (1992) has been the focus of 
attention in the methodological literature is precisely because it complements its 
theoretical analysis with  an empirical model designed for econometric analysis, thus 
illustrating the relations which can be involved between one level and another.  
 
Given that the objective of the empirical model is to be able to contrast by econometric 
means the argumentative mechanism derived from the theoretical model, the  former is 
clearly inspired by this mechanism. Thus, the empirical model consists of two 
equations, each of which reflects one of the two major parts or phases of the proposed 
mechanism: the influence of the loss of skills on job offers, and the influence which 
these offers are supposed to have on the probability of finding work. This is why 
Pissarides admits that the theoretical analysis carried out in the earlier part of his article 
contains the ingredients of this empirical model. But going further, he even claims that 
this model is implied by  his theoretical analysis, even though it is not clear in what 
precise meaning he uses this term.  
 
Kevin Hoover (2001) takes on this statement, highlighting, for example, that the 
variables which appear in each model are distinct; that variables as significant in 
theoretical analysis as the loss of skills resulting from unemployment are not expressly 
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appear in the empirical model which do not do so as such in the theoretical model. 
Summing up, Hoover (2001: 26) sustains that, far from being able to talk of implication 
between both models, the linkage between them is exceedingly loose and analogical, so 
that drawing conclusions about either of them based on the other ‘requires an 
imaginative leap’. 
 
 
3. Simplicity,  understanding and plausibility  
 
3.1. Some manifest characteristics of models 
 
Does the illustrative perspective of models add any significant consideration or any  
new emphasis? In relation to this question,  let us begin by commenting some very 
evident characteristics of models which not only are coherent with an exemplifying aim, 
but which can contribute positively to ensure that that this aim is achieved. 
  
 Mathematical models and narrative arguments 
 
Among these , it is worth pointing out that the theoretical models are generally 
mathematical models, and thus linguistic ones. The similarity which an example should 
maintain with other instances of the class  that is exemplified by it confers a special 
meaning to this circumstance.
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Normally, no attempt is made for a model to serve as a basis for explaining all the 
questions and regularities which may be present in a field, as was held by the traditional 
idea of theories. Models are exercises aimed at analysing a very determined set of 
questions. As Herbert Simon (1969) underlines, this circumstance increases the 
possibilities of constructing alternative models, and also increases the possibilities of 
using models of a different physical nature from the simulated system. Many 
economists may still remember the hydraulic version of the circular model of income 
which was described in macroeconomic textbooks.  
 
It may well be that soon many economic models will be computer programs. Today, 
theoretical models in economics are usually mathematical models, and since they are 
conceptual or linguistic, they allow us to configure situations or environments of the 
same kind as the empirical  situations or environments which are the final object of 
analysis. As a result, they make it easier to export reasoning and conclusions to real 
cases and systems, whether by analogical or inductive means. 
 
The mathematical character of theoretical models  suggests another common 
characteristic of models, to which I have already referred a few pages earlier:  the use of 
demonstrations with a less formalist style and a more narrative aim. Mary Morgan 
(2002a) highlights the explanatory capacity of narrations offered by the models and 
their role in applying theoretical analyses to the real world. In terms of this paper, the 
corresponding idea would be the analogical capacity of argumentative mechanisms, 
which they have in part because of the way in which they combine  proof and narration. 
Perhaps the  main difference between  Morgan’s position and the one adopted in the 
present paper lies in the fact that  she seems to separate the ideas of demonstration and 
narration more  than I do. 
  12 
Similarity and credibility 
 
It should in any event be pointed out that the characteristics outlined above, and in 
general the relations of similarity between the world configured by the model and the 
real world may also be useful in allowing or favouring compliance with other ends and 
functions, and in particular in facilitating inductive inferences. 
 
Sugden (2000: 23-7) highlights this circumstance pointing out that to be able to export 
the results obtained in the analysis of the model to real cases, the type of entity 
configured in the model has to be similar and of the same class as these cases, even 
though it may be fictitious. He proposes the property of credibility as a way of 
expanding this idea and making the relevant relations of similarity more concrete. In his 
opinion, credible models would be able to convert worlds, entities or situations 
configured by them into worlds, entities or situations which, though imaginary and 
fictitious, could be real and behave as if they were so. Thus entities or situations are 
created that are parallel (analogical in the relevant aspects) to corresponding empirical 
worlds, entities or situations. This enables us to infer how these worlds, entities or 
empirical situations behave, based on the observed behaviour in corresponding parallel 
constructions. It is a similar inference to those which we feel authorized to use when we 
observe regular phenomena in other similar empirical systems or situations.  
 
The simplicity of examples. Familiar or prototypical situations 
 
Although drawn up in an original way and focused on the  central problem posed by 
theoretical economic models, Sugden’s argument actually reflects a more general 
phenomenon: that inductive inferences, conceived in a classical way as inferences from 
the particular to the general or under the modality of induction by enumeration (these 
are the two ways of understanding the induction which Sugden expressly defends), 
seem to demand, or be helped by, greater levels of similarity (in the relevant aspects).  
 
But for this same reason, these classical inductive relations do not seem to  be favoured 
by the high level of simplification and idealization of theoretical models so well, 
especially if  it is assumed that these models constitute the evidence on which the 
corresponding inferences should be judged. In fact, quite the reverse: if similarity is the 
only or main justification of these inferences, the construction of models should search 
for the greatest degree of approximation possible to reality.   
 
Instead, the requirement for similarity in the case of examples, and particularly if they 
are constructed specifically to serve as such – as is the case of illustrative models – is 
subordinated to the principal end of favouring the understanding of the object which is 
exemplified. This finality tends to demand the utmost simplification and idealization of 
the example, and to paraphrase an expression of Gibbard and Varian, a deliberate 
distortion of reality beyond any reasonable level of approximation.  
 
To say that the models are of necessity simplified is simply trite and vacuous. The basic 
reasons why models incorporate numerous and significant idealizing simplifications 
have been the frequent object of attention in the literature, and are well known. Take, 
for example, the descriptive inadequacy resulting from the demand for basing 
explanations on the agents’ decisions (cf. Hoover, 2001: 70), and the case of the 
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(equilibrium itself can be seen as an idealization with an important role in this respect: 
cf. Sen, 1986). 
 
To these well-known reasons another less familiar one could be added. The use of 
models as examples is a powerful and familiar additional reason for making them 
simpler still, particularly when they illustrate regularities and new arguments. A 
fundamental and generally accepted characteristic of a good example is that it should be 
as simple as possible. It should limit itself to the fundamental or crucial characteristics 
of the object or idea which is being exemplified, to make it easier to grasp and 
understand with greater clarity. If it is also a case of exemplifying an argumentative 
pattern to make its understanding easier, the example should  focus as far as possible on 
the illustration of the key elements and connections of the reasoning. For this,  
complications which are not strictly necessary should be avoided, and  the example 
should be isolated from other influences and from possible perturbations.
15 At the same 
time, it may also happen that the example is situated in an extreme or limiting situation, 
to show its intensity, force or robustness (see, for instance, Gibbard and Varian, 1978: 
674, note 10; Sugden, 2000: 5, 8; and Salop and Stiglitz, 1977: 495). 
 
It should be noted that the malleability offered by theoretical modelling usually makes it 
easier to construct more clarifying examples than real cases could usually be, even when 
such cases are considered prototypical (cf. Elgin, 2006: 10-12). Incidentally, the other 
side of the same malleability is that it favours speculation and makes empirical control 
and model selection more difficult. 
 
Of course, the degree of simplification is not uniform. It will tend to be greater in initial 
models constructed for putting forward the most original results. The handling of 
simplicity in the strategy of exemplification is not different in general terms from the 
habitual practice  under the analytical  method typical of scientific activity. However, 
the search for an increasing level of generality does not necessarily mean that more 
complex and general models should no longer be also used as simplified examples, as 
the principle of successive approximations suggested.  
 
The tasks of simplifying and idealizing are selective. From the illustrative perspective it 
is entirely natural that the  pattern of mechanism which the model should exemplify is 
the reference which guides and conditions these tasks, whose aim is that  this pattern 
should be clearly understood. This is another way of saying that the formulation of the 
model serves this end rather than other representational purposes  
 
The relations of similarity (or positive analogies) between a model and the cases 
exemplified by it are also selective. These relations should occur in the relevant aspects. 
The  pattern of mechanism  also functions as a reference guide  in determining which 
aspects can be relevant and which not. As a general idea, relevant aspects are those 
whose modification could change the nature of the argumentative pattern, and relations 
of similarity may remain within the margin of variation which these aspects admit as 
long as there is no modification which distorts  the argument.
16     
 
I suggested above that the habitually high level of simplification of models seems to fit 
better from the perspective which attributes an exemplifying function to models than 
from the inductive perspective. The same appears to occur with another circumstance 
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some contributions the analysis is focused on cases or situations of a particularly 
familiar or well-known type, so that the phenomena and problems being studied are 
presented in a typical or highly familiar way, and are understood easier (cf. Akerlof: 
489).  
 
3.2. The aim of favouring understanding  
 
Although it is a less tangible characteristic than those mentioned so far, the illustrative 
perspective of models situates understanding as a common and  outstanding aim of 
theoretical research.  This is precisely the  aim normally sought when using examples 
with didactic purposes: to aid understanding of what is being exemplified as far as 
possible, so that the comprehension and knowledge thus acquired can be applied in 
analysing other possible instances (Elgin, 2006: 1, 12).  
 
Thus, admitting that theoretical models could be used as illustrative examples and that 
their argumentative function is a key point for being used in this way (1) contributes to 
support the idea that understanding and making comprehensible how and why economic 
phenomena are produced is a primordial aim of theoretical research, (an idea that is 
coherent with the reiterated valuations which theoreticians make of models for the 
understanding they facilitate and offer); (2) suggests that analysing models as examples 
and understanding properly the way they work is a habitual strategy for pursuing this 
end; and (3) also suggests that the comprehension facilitated by a good model could be 
the main basis for exporting the same type of analysis to other cases, both theoretical 
and empirical.
17  
 
3.3. The other side of the coin: detecting possible perturbations 
 
Sugden (2000) also highlights the understanding offered by models about the way they 
work as one of the most important elements in exporting results to the real world.  
However, he appears to put it almost entirely at the service of inductive inference of the 
main regularity.
18  
 
This way of stressing comprehension runs the risk of relegating an important aspect of 
its role to the background. The general awareness that regular economic associations 
should be understood as tendencies has been around for a long time now.
19 It is 
important to know that a certain association could take place in a particular domain of 
cases; but at least as important as this is to know when and in what conditions this 
association can be expected to take place, and when and in what circumstances the 
contrary may take place. The normal way of doing so in  theoretical research is to try to 
understand how and why this regularity takes place. Because, like the other side of the 
coin, this understanding also tends to offer valuable information about the possible 
perturbations which may prevent the regularity from taking place. 
 
An  explanatory argument, especially if it is formalized, segments reasoning into 
simpler steps, and establishes precisely the direct relations of inferential dependence 
which are established in each one of them, providing information about changes in the 
step premises which would not lead to the conclusion reached in the corresponding step. 
In addition, as they are rigorously formulated, these direct relations also generate in a 
precise way the indirect relations of inferential dependence and provide information 
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agents and in the causal factors which could prevent the main regularity from occurring. 
Thus, as well as establishing the desired result, an argumentative mechanism facilitates 
the appreciation of the robustness or fragility of the steps taken, and favours the search 
and identification of perturbations which could change the conclusion reached in each 
case and which, given the chain of inferential relations, could end up altering the final 
effect. For example, if one thinks of a situation similar to that proposed by Akerlof 
(1970), but with buyers who are more eager to have a car, the greater the intensity of 
this eagerness the greater the price they are prepared to pay will be. In this way, it may 
be that they end up buying despite the fact that they estimate the quality as being well 
below the best quality on sale. Analogously, if one of the institutions designed to 
mitigate the informational asymmetry of which the author speaks at the end of his 
article comes into play, the expectations that the  “lemons principle” will operate will 
diminish, because the information which the buyers have or use will be greater than that 
assumed in the model.  
 
3.4. Analogical export of results and developing the capacity of analysis 
 
The conception of models as sources of inductive inferences tends to favour the idea 
that the application or export of the results obtained from the analysis of models to the 
real world is a direct, almost mechanical application. In contrast, the emphasis on the 
idea of models as examples and their argumentative function brings to the fore the 
didactic function of theory and theoretical research.
 20 It favours the vision of theory as a 
type of conceptual laboratory (Hicks, 1983: 174; Mäki, 2005: 308-9), where the 
specialists analyse and learn how and why the economic phenomena and regular 
associations are produced (Morgan, 1999; Sugden, 2005a: 184), and are then be able to 
apply their knowledge to the variety of cases and situations which may occur. 
 
 Given a set of theoretical or empirical cases, the analysis of the original model may  
provide suggestions and indications about the type of reasons and arguments by which 
the regularity should be produced in these other situations, in its role as example or 
prototype and to the extent that it has been clearly understood. In addition, by 
fragmenting the explanation into steps and establishing clearly the inferential 
dependencies, it is usually also easier to identify possible perturbations. As a result and 
according to the knowledge of these other cases, conjectures tend to be generated about 
whether the  environment conditions and the behaviour of the agents in these other 
cases allow us or not introduce a variant of the prototypical argument giving as a result 
the regularity sought, or a variant of it. If these conjectures are affirmative, the 
following stages could constitute the creation of a series of increasingly detailed and 
more solid analogical argumentative mechanisms.
21  
 
The knowledge and understanding obtained in this way are based on constructions 
which are usually highly simplified and openly unreal. At the same time, the empirical 
cases and situations can be very diverse in relevant aspects and, when this circumstance 
occurs, the idea of disposing of an array of theoretical analyses which includes one 
directly applicable to each  type of possible empirical cases is simply utopian. For this 
reason, the empirical application of a theory with this structure cannot be adjusted to the 
traditional idea according to which an empirical case within the domain of a theory must 
be a direct instance of a result or of a theoretical model, even with the application of  
bridge, correspondence or similar rules. This traditional idea converts the empirical 
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a theory as an economic theory, including by econometric models, is a question which 
demands substantial doses of interpretation. Applying a theory to an empirical situation 
requires it to be interpreted in the light of the expert judgment of someone who correctly 
understands the mechanisms which operate in the relevant theoretical constructions and 
simulations. For this reason, although not only for this reason, understanding is so 
important in this class of theories. Equally, the frequent disagreements between experts 
in interpreting or analysing a concrete situation are not so surprising. They would be 
really surprising if the application was, for example, one such as schematized by the 
nomological-deductive model of explanation and prediction. But this is not the case.      
 
It is also worth mentioning that this illustrative and didactic dimension,, seems to favour 
a vision of theory with a significant instrumental dimension; but  rather than being in 
the line defended by M. Friedman, this instrumental dimension would be closer to the 
ideas of Robert Aumann (1985) or Joseph Schumpeter (1954: 15, 474), who draws 
attention to Joan Robinson’s description of economic theory which she calls “a box of 
analytical tools” as particularly felicitous.  
 
3.5. Tension in theoretical explanations between rigour and generality 
 
The capacity of argumentative mechanisms derived from models to suggest and to 
facilitate the recognition of variants of the argumentative pattern adapted to other cases  
can partially counteract two common properties of models: their loss of realism and 
their restricted level of generality. Thus the strategy of constructing and using models as 
examples may be seen as a kind of compromise between two poles in tension. On the 
one hand, the demand that  explanatory arguments should be individualist and have the 
precision and rigour of mathematical demonstrations, with  the habitual consequences 
of demand for specification, high simplification level, loss of realism and loss of 
generality. And on the other, the property traditionally associated with theoretical 
explanations and the theories themselves of being sufficiently close to reality and 
having a sufficient level of generality as well.
22 However, Franklin Fisher (1989) seems 
to see the loss of generality as an inescapable and disadvantageous characteristic of this 
style of theorizing, which he calls “exemplifying theory”as opposed to “generalizing 
theories” such as general equilibrium and consumer’s demand theory. 
 
3.6. Supporting the main regularity 
 
To explain a main regularity in regard to a domain of informal cases and situations, it is 
not enough that an argument implies it deductively. Explaining convincingly imposes 
requirements on the truth or, at least, on the plausibility of the applied argument’s 
intermediate connections. Consequently, the informal arguments suggested by the  
explanatory development of a good model should be sufficiently plausible or reliable in 
reference to cases and situations to which they would be applied. In addition, given that 
an argument of this kind tends to be the conjunction of the regular intermediate 
associations of which it is composed, these associations should enjoy a level of 
reliability sufficient to support the level of reliability of the whole argument.
23   
 
Even the most generalized argumentative variants, as we have  seen in relation with 
Akerlof’s  model, tend to enjoy this level of plausibility, despite being notoriously 
vague and schematic.  
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This requirement can bring with it a consequence which is worth mentioning  with 
regard to the type of inference which would support the main regularity.  Note in 
addition that, as it has been formerly emphasized, the informal analogical arguments 
arising from the argumentative development of the model tend to logically imply the 
main regularity (or its corresponding version), as formalized arguments do. Thus we can 
also take for granted that on these occasions, the level of reliability of the argument is 
transmitted to the (hypothesis on the validity of the) main regularity.  
 
Because of all this, the possibility arises that the level of plausibility which a good 
model transfers to an analogous applied mechanism suggested by it is  higher  than that 
which the corresponding analogous regularity derived from this mechanism can  earn by 
itself. On these occasions, this regularity is reliable or admissible not so much because 
of the confidence or plausibility it gives rise to of itself, but because of the suggested 
explanation about the form in which it is produced or could be produced. In this sense, 
it may be confusing to highlight almost exclusively the inductive character of the 
inferences which back the main regularity. The understanding of the original 
argumentative mechanism, and the plausibility that this understanding can transmit to 
the analogical argument suggested by it, may provide (deductively) the regularity in 
question with a reliability which it lacks in itself and is far superior to that which it 
could receive by inductive means.  Returning to Akerlof’s model again, this 
phenomenon seems obvious. The  “lemons principle” is more seriously admissible after 
understanding how and why it is produced, first when the set of qualities is discrete, and 
then within the framework of the formalized model. Analogously, the idea that the price 
dispersion of the same good can be the systematic consequence of different attitudes 
and costs required for obtaining information, is perceived as a more solid  association 
after understanding the argumentative functioning of Salop and Stiglitz’s model.  The 
mechanism  proposed by Pissarides (1992) to explain how the loss of skills during a 
period of unemployment ends up producing persistent unemployment,  gives an 
explanation and  at the same time lays a foundation for this regularity.  Reading the 
argument derived from the Brander and Spencer (1983) model allows us to understand 
the function of subsidies for R&D granted to domestic companies competing in the 
international market; and when this function is understood, its frequent use and 
concession is seen as a regular phenomenon which is not accidental or due to occasional 
pressure. Paraphrasing an old and well-known idea, we could say that on these 
occasions, the explanations work by reducing the explanandum to something more 
plausible (and not necessarily more familiar).  
 
But this is not always the case. It is not the case when the explanandum is, for instance, 
a phenomenon which has occurred and is well-known. Although the explanandum is a 
hypothesis about a regularity, it may be that the explanans does not offer additional 
confidence because the regularity may count with solid evidence in its favour. For 
example, the theory of demand does not sustain the law of demand in the same way as 
the arguments alluded to in the examples mentioned in the previous paragraph do with 
the corresponding regularities. Something similar may occur with experiments which 
Sugden (2005b) calls ‘exhibits’ and the deviation theories which are proposed for 
explaining them.   
 
 In any event, as is habitual with theoretical proposals in economics, the intermediate 
associations stated  in an applied argument  should be interpreted as tendencies, because 
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previously taken into account. Because of this, the plausibility transmitted to the main 
regularity can only confer on it this same sense of hypothesis and tendency. What a 
satisfactory exercise tends to transmit is the conviction that the  intermediate regularities 
of the explanatory pattern  and the main regularity are sufficiently serious empirical 
possibilities  to be the object of theoretical research and later empirical research, both at 
the theoretical level, and in applications to singular empirical cases or  domains of such 
cases (cf. Krugman 1995: 80). 
 
Perhaps it is worth adding another qualification, this time regarding the evidence used 
in the inductive inferences which can back hypotheses about intermediate associations 
of the argumentative mechanism or about the main regularity.  
 
The idea that a hypothesis on the empirical validity of regularities which are proposed 
on the basis of the model receive inductive support from it, could be understood in the 
sense that  “there are reasons to believe that these regularities operate in the real world, 
precisely because they are fulfilled in the  model.” If this form of understanding things 
were correct, it would be enough to observe or check that these regularities are fulfilled 
in the analysed model to induce the corresponding support.  
 
However, in a process of understanding, such as that leading from the knowledge and 
study of a model, the evidence in play is not limited to what happens within this 
framework. The model activates the process, but the evidence that is in play involves  
our knowledge, beliefs and representations of cases and situations in the corresponding 
domain (cf. Rumelhart, 1980). For this reason, any inductive inferences will be based on  
much broader evidence than that provided by the model. The judgements of plausibility 
or confidence which result will be parallel and based on the same evidence as the 
recognition of positive, negative and neutral analogies which accompany the 
construction itself of the model and its analysis.
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4. Summary 
 
In the preceding pages I have tried to show that, given the familiarity of the didactic 
recourse to examples, the illustrative perspective of models provides an articulated 
overview of their function and of the most notable characteristics of numerous 
theoretical models, such as their degree of simplification and idealization for instance, 
in which each of these characteristics finds its place and justification in a natural 
manner. 
 
From this perspective I have  emphasized how crucial is the function of exemplification 
carried out by the demonstrative argument of the main regularity. This argument 
describes a mechanism by which the regularity is produced, and also has an  
explanatory function (susceptible to be also considered as predictive). The combination 
of this explicative dimension and the  exemplifying function highlights (1) the role of 
the argumentative pattern when it comes to inspiring the formulation of the model itself 
and deciding the simplifications which may be admitted and the similarities which 
should be maintained; (2) the importance of understanding in theoretical work; (3) the 
analogical and tentative character of the application of models; (4) the idea that the 
focus of this application is the argumentative mechanism; and (5) the didactic function 
of theory.     
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 When applying models, the main regularity depends inferentially on the variant of the 
argumentative mechanism adapted to the corresponding case or domain. For this reason, 
the degree of plausibility attributed to this regularity may result not so much from the 
degree of confidence which the regularity could earn inductively by itself, as from the 
plausibility that the argumentative mechanism transmits deductively, especially if 
empirical evidence is weak and empirical studies are scarce. 
 
                                                 
1 Mary Morgan (2002b) contends that the epistemic function of models is only really fulfilled when they 
are used. By choosing the expression ‘using models’ I  try to highlight that the theses sustained in my 
article are congruent with  Morgan’s idea. 
  Samuel Bentolila and Juan Urrutia subjected a previous version of this work to detailed criticism, 
for which I am very grateful. I also want to express my thanks to León Olivé for the valuable 
commentaries he offered me when these ideas were presented in a seminar held in June 2006 in the 
Institute for Philosophical Research of the Autónoma University of  Mexico, and to Eduardo Bustos for 
the information he has provided to me on analogy and metaphor. 
2 A glance at any of the more widely-read academic journals published in recent years shows the 
frequency with which the authors express themselves in similar terms. 
3 Backhouse (2002: 209) briefly outlines a similar position with reference to Akerlof’s model.  
  I use the term 'mechanism’ in a similar sense to that indicated by Backhouse (2002: 202), as a 
series of events or changes described by the demonstrative argument derived from the model. It is in this 
sense that I sometimes use the expression “argumentative mechanism”. By analogy, a  “pattern of 
mechanism” is that outlined by the corresponding pattern of argument.  
4 Recently, Sugden (2005b: 298) refers to the main theses of his 2000 article in terms by which he seems 
to reinforce the analogical dimension associated with inferences made from models to the real world: 
‘Experimental exhibits serve this purpose [as elements in explanatory and predictive schemes] when we 
recognize analogies between them and phenomena “in the real world” ... The implicit claim is that the 
real-world phenomenon and the experimental exhibit are likely to be products of the same causal factors, 
and hence that by understanding the exhibit, we may get closer to understanding the real world 
phenomenon. The analogical reasoning involved here is similar to the reasoning by which abstract 
theoretical models are presented as explanations of real world phenomena (for more on this, see Sugden 
2000).’ 
5 Cf. Stiglitz (2002) and Akerlof (2002). The latter gives as precedents some models of growth theory. 
6 Gibbard and Varian (1978) highlight this model as an example of the models they classify as 
“caricatures”. 
7 Studied by Nancy Cartwright (1997) and Kevin Hoover (2001). 
8 I take it for granted that the regular associations which I discuss in the text should be understood as 
tendencies, as is normally the case in economics. 
9 However, see the observations in Sugden (2000: 6,8) on the vagueness with which Akerlof presents the 
principle. 
10 For  the sake of simplicity I will also suppose that the factors are postulated as such, and not as 
consequences of the  environment conditions or the behaviour of the actors, which is what happens, for 
example, in Lucas (1972). 
11 Sugden (2000: 19)  emphasizes the idea that the model explains the main regularity: ‘If the 
generalizations are to be interpreted as observed regularities, the models are supposed to explain why they 
are true.’  
The legacy of the axiomatic tradition continues to invite an identification of theoretical models 
with their formulation. However,  their most analytically decisive dimension is the way  they function, i.e. 
the development of the corresponding argument.  
  Hughes (1997: 331-2) highlights the dynamic functioning which gives rise to the desired results 
as one of the most characteristic properties of scientific models and mathematical representations in 
general. At the same time, he highlights this property as one of the reasons for which mathematical 
models are the rule in physics. 
12 With regard to the Kuhnian concept of a paradigm, Kuhn (1970) and Stegmüller (1976) refer to the 
presentation made by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations of the possibility of capturing a 
vague concept such as  “game” through paradigmatic examples.  
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13 Naturally, judgements on the plausibility of the individual parts of an applied analogical argument and 
the confidence which the argument itself offers may vary when the available evidence increases or when 
more defined argumentative variants are constructed.  
14 Curiously, one of the models on which Sugden (2000) focuses his analysis, Schelling’s “checkerboard 
city”, is not a mathematical model: in fact, it is a board game. Nevertheless, Sugden attributes to it a 
correspondence with real cases which is similar to that which it could have if it were a mathematical 
construction. 
15 From a general point of view, Catherine Elgin (2006: 8-11; 17-8) stresses this aspect of exemplifying. 
At the same time, the authors of nearly all the models which I have referred to in documenting and 
illustrating my argument expressly state that they have made these kinds of decisions (Akerlof, 1973; 
490-1; Spence, 1973: 364; Salop and Stiglitz, 1976: 493, 508; Brander and Spencer 1983: 711; and 
Pissarides, 1992: 1372, 1381). On the operations of isolation and its similarity to experimental isolation, 
see Mäki (2005) and the references there on Mäki’s method of isolation. 
  The effort to simplify demanded by exemplification would correspond to what Gibbard and 
Varian (1978) associate with the construction of  “caricature” models.  They do not mention the 
exemplifying function of models or its argumentative development, but they do stress the aim of 
facilitating understanding of the phenomena under analysis, and of doing so in the way considered typical 
of good examples: highlighting the key characteristics and avoiding unnecessary complications. In 
addition, it is precisely for these latter two reasons that they associate these models with caricatures. 
   The effort to simplify may also affect the mathematical plane. In Akerlof (1970) and Spence 
(1973), for example, there is a clear aim of simplifying the mathematical apparatus as far as possible to 
the most elemental level; and in general, some simplifications of content are also undertaken to prevent 
mathematical complications (see, for example, Brander and Spencer, 1983: 717). 
16 For example, I have already mentioned with  regard to Akerlof’s model that varying the functions of 
utility and demand on the part of the buyers could radically alter the result. Because of this, these 
functions are a relevant aspect. But there is a possible margin of variation possible in which the 
requirements of similarity are not damaged. These functions could vary while the price which the buyers 
are prepared to pay does not equal the price at which the sellers are prepared to sell. 
17 Cf. Boumans (2004: 269-72) on the traditional association of models with the aim of facilitating 
comprehension.  
18 In the light of pages 24 and 25 of Sugden’s article and with  regard to models such as Akerlof’s, the 
structure of corresponding inference appears to be this. ‘What we know (or think we know) about the 
general laws governing events in the real world’ allows us to construct a model which configures an 
imaginary but credible case, i.e. which could be real and in which things happen as if it were. In addition, 
we can easily understand how the model works, and this authorizes us to suppose that numerous variants 
of the model can be constructed in which the main regularity is complied with. Thus, ‘we are invited to 
make the inductive inference that similar causal processes apply in real markets, with similar effects.’ In 
accordance with this, we infer that, in the absence of perturbations, the causal factors also produce in the 
real world the effect which they originate in the world of the model. In short, understanding of the model 
and its credibility (itself based on our knowledge of the world), are the two pillars on which the inductive 
inference of the generalized version of the main regularity is based, together with the support or 
confidence which we deposit in its compliance. 
19 According to the well-known thesis of Nancy Cartwright (1999), unrestricted universality would not be 
a property of physical laws either.  
20 Mongin (2001) explicitly qualifies the illustrative task performed by models as ‘didactic’. 
21 The model could also be applied  aiming only to export the main regularity without the argumentative 
mechanism. This seems to be the type of application which Sugden (2002: 24-5) describes, though he also 
talks of making ‘the inductive inference that similar causal processes apply in real markets, with similar 
effects’ (see note 18).   
22 The traditional vision of theoretical explanations may raise the question as to why explicative patterns 
of general scope are exemplified using explicative arguments derived from unrealistic models with a 
restricted level of generality, instead of directly developing and proposing general explanations. Krugman 
(1995) can be read as a response to this question. 
23 In addition, for the explanation to be relevant for any case or situation, the initial (and the intermediate) 
factors must operate in the situation at hand, or at least it must be actually possible that they should 
operate. Otherwise, the corresponding regularity would be irrelevant for the case in hand.  
24 Using a different line of reasoning, Boumans (1999) stresses that empirical justification may be a 
salient aspect in model building. Sugden (2000) also stresses the role of empirical adequacy in building 
credible models.  
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